1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE
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4	VALVE CORPORATION, CV23-01016-JNW
5	Plaintiff,) SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
6	v.) September 20, 2024 -) 10:00 a.m.
7	LEIGH ROTHSCHILD, ROTHSCHILD) BROADCAST DISTRIBUTION)
8	SYSTEMS, LLC, DISPLAY) MOTION HEARING TECHNOLOGIES, LLC,)
9	PATENT ASSET MANAGEMENT, LLC,) MEYLER LEGAL, PLLC, AND SAMUEL)
10	MEYLER,)
11	Defendants.))
12	
13	VERBATIM REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMAL N. WHITEHEAD
14 15	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
16	APPEARANCES:
17	For the Plaintiff: Dario Machleidt Christopher P. Damition
18	Kathleen Geyer Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP
19	1420 5th Avenue Suite 3700
20	Seattle, WA 98101
21	
22	For the Defendants: Donald R. McPhail Merchant & Gould
23	1900 Duke Street Suite 600
24	Alexandria, Virginia 22314
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	Proceedings stenographically reported and transcript produced with computer-aided technology

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              THE COURT: Please be seated.
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         This is the matter of Valve Corporation versus Rothschild, et
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     al., Cause No. CR23-1016, assigned to this court.
         Will counsel please rise and make their appearances for the
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     record?
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              MR. MACHLEIDT: Your Honor, Dario Machleidt on behalf of
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            Starting at the end of the table, we have Chris Damition
     Valve.
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     and then Kate Geyer, both, also, outside counsel for Valve, and
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     then next to me is Chris Schenck, in-house counsel for Valve.
              THE COURT: Very good. Good morning, all.
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              MS. GEYER: Good morning.
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              MR. SCHENCK: Good morning.
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              MR. MCPHAIL: Don McFail of Merchant & Gould for all of
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     the defendants. Good morning, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          Good morning.
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         All right. Well, we are here this morning on defendants'
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     motion to dismiss. This has been pending longer than I'd like,
     so I do apologize for that, but we are here today. I'm not going
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     to rule from the bench, but I do suspect that we will have a
     ruling for you all in very short order.
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         So with that, let's hear from defendants here. We will start
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     with defendants, we will go to plaintiff, and then we will give
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     defendants the final word.
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              MR. MCPHAIL: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you very
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much.

This case is, to be blunt, a monumental waste of the court's resources and time. What could have been resolved with a simple e-mail has been turned into a federal case by Valve. There's no reason that we should be here; there's no reason we should be using the court's time; there's no reason so many lawyers should be in this courtroom.

In terms of the declaratory judgment action, the case law is very, very clear that an enforceable covenant not to sue divests this court of jurisdiction on patent validity and enforceability claims. They have an enforceable covenant not to sue. To the extent that is not sufficient for them, we have offered to give them whatever covenant they need, we will put in any language they want, but there are no grounds for this court to be looking at the validity or enforceability of any patent in this matter.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, to the extent there are grounds, I mean, isn't this a case of Rothschild perhaps creating this case or controversy? I mean, that's certainly what they have alleged here. You're right, I mean, I have looked at the case law about covenants not to sue, and I think it's fairly clear in its operation, but in looking at those cases, I really struggle to find one that matched up with this scenario, where we have got agreements that were made, expectations settled between the parties, and then the patent holder sending out demand letters, detailed demand letters at that, perhaps creating a case or controversy. So what am I do with that? I mean, we have got

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affirmative acts by the Rothschild defendants perhaps putting the patent '221 into play.

MR. MACHLEIDT: Even with the letters, with the covenant
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not to sue, they could never have brought suit under the '221 patent, right? That would have been their immediate defense.

They could have dismissed any action for infringement on that covenant not to sue. We would have had no response to it.

What you have here is an unfortunate situation of a couple of clerical errors, the first due to an attorney who was very ill and passing at the time, and the second to a new attorney to the whole field. Each time -- in the first instance, they resolved it by sending a letter. The case was immediately dismissed. They could have done the same thing here on the demand letters, just a simple e-mail back saying: Guys, here's a reminder, we have a license to this patent. That would have been the end of it. But, instead, they have decided they want to file a case and bring us all here into court.

THE COURT: I mean, is that really their burden?

Perhaps with the earlier action on the '723 patent, maybe, but we have got perhaps a repeated course of conduct on the part of the Rothschild defendants in asserting -- alleging, I should say, infringement against someone that has a license. So, again, what am I do with that when I'm looking at the totality of the circumstances?

MR. MCPHAIL: Well, in that letter you're referring to,

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     the June 2023 letter, there were three patents raised.
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     those, there were actually colorable claims for infringement.
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     was only one of those patents where they had a license, the '221.
     So, again, I don't deny that it was an error on the part of the
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     Rothschild defendants to even include that in the letter, but it
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     could have been resolved by them just responding again. Is it
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     their burden to do that? I think it's their burden to avoid
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     bringing an action where there's no real damage, there's no real
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     controversy other than the fact that they're annoyed. And I'm
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     sorry they're annoyed. We've promised we will never do it again.
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     I can promise you it will never happen again. But it did happen
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     twice.
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              THE COURT: The law would couch it in terms of
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     reasonable apprehension of litigation. I mean, I think that's
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     what they've have alleged, in looking at these letters and the
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     course of conduct, is a reasonable apprehension.
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         So tell me this, I mean, if this case were to proceed, would
     the Rothschild defendants raise counterclaims of infringement?
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              MR. MCPHAIL: Yes, in this instance, we would. We would
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MR. MCPHAIL: Yes, in this instance, we would. We would raise breach of contract and patent infringement.

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THE COURT: All right. What else would you like to tell me?

MR. MCPHAIL: In terms of the contract actions, we've just been sort of talking about that. I will concede to you that there was a breach of the contract in 2022, but that breach was

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remedied promptly, and they never bothered to raise anything about it until the June letters and this whole action was brought. We think they waived any right to complain about it, but even if they hadn't, there were no damages that arose from that. It was inconvenience. They wrote a letter back to us, that's it. I don't see how there's any damages there even if there was a technical breach of the contract. Again, no reason for this court to be dealing with this.

And in terms of the Washington State Patent Troll Act, I have to confess, I'm walking in unchartered territory. It's my understanding this is the only case that has ever been brought that invokes that statute in a private party action. understanding is the only other action was brought by the Washington State Attorney General against Landmark. And this case is not Landmark. Mr. Rothschild is not Landmark. He is an inventor himself. He is a prolific inventor. He has a lot of his own patents and he's acquired a lot of patents. He learned the value of patents. And I'm not going to deny that he does try to enforce those patents when he thinks there's an opportunity to do so, but that in and of itself is not a bad act. He has justifiable grounds. Investigations are done before any letters are ever sent. There are claim charts usually associated with his letters. This isn't frivolous. This isn't Shipping and Handling sending out thousands of letters and settling for \$5,000 a pop. These are legitimate claims, to the extent they exist,

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and that's the sort of thing that the Washington State Troll Act
I think is supposed to be permitting. It shouldn't be
foreclosing it.
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If you take their position, it's going to have a tremendous chilling effect on patent owners. They will be unable to send out notice letters without fear that all of a sudden someone is going to raise a private cause of action under the Washington State Patent Troll Act. So we don't think that has any grounds to be a part of this case either and that should also be dismissed.

And the final thing is the issue of damages. To the extent they're entitled to damages under the settlement agreement from 2016, they haven't actually suffered any damages. They have been inconvenienced, but their business has not been harmed in any way. They have suffered no actual loss. There's nothing here for the court to judge on. There's nothing here for the court to give them. They, at best, have some attorneys' fees, but that in and of itself is not a damage. And so we think this case should be dismissed. There's no reason it should be here.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MCPHAIL: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. MACHLEIDT: Your Honor, Dario Machleidt on behalf of Valve.

Can you see the slides? And you should have a hard copy with

you.

THE COURT: Yes, I have got them in front of me now.

Thank you.

MR. MACHLEIDT: Your Honor, there's plenty that defense counsel just went into that I will respond to, but I want to begin with this point: The actions of Mr. Rothschild, his companies, and his lawyers are exactly the type of conduct that the Washington Troll Act is meant to stop. They repeatedly asserted licensed patents against Valve despite the fact that Valve sent them, sent their lawyer, the license agreement; therefore, reminded them about the agreement. They still kept going after Valve again and again. I understand that the defendants wish Valve had not brought this lawsuit, but nothing that they have argued, nothing that they have raised, justifies dismissing the case, certainly not at this stage.

Your Honor, I do think it helps to begin with the cause of action for a violation of the Washington Troll Act. I think when you look at the facts and the evidence that we have alleged, that you see in the complaint, that gives rise to our Troll Act claim, that sort of colors every other cause of action and allows you to see why none of their arguments in favor of dismissal carry any weight.

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah, I mean, I will certainly hear you out if you're saying this is going to contextualize other arguments, but, I mean, you know, starting with jurisdiction

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seems like the logical place to me. I mean, they're arguing that the court is divested of jurisdiction by the covenant not to sue, that there isn't a case or controversy. So I'll listen to you now and I will look at the slides, but, you know, it's important that we make that connection because that's really the threshold question: Can I hear this?

MR. MACHLEIDT: Absolutely, Your Honor. I'm happy to ping-pong to the relevant part of the slides because, I agree, it is certainly a threshold question.

And I think the way you phrased it to defense counsel is exactly right. The court takes into account the totality of the circumstances. That's what the Federal Circuit cases talk about. We have Gen-Probe here on the slide, that's one of the examples, and that's why the covenant not to sue never starts and stops the inquiry. You have to look at everything around it. And as you pointed out here, we have breaches, we have -- Valve has plausibly alleged material breaches of the license agreement and, therefore, the covenant not to sue. That did not happen factually in the *Gen-Probe* case because -- I'll admit, I have not found a published decision where the licensor, not once but multiple times, breached the license by going after the licensee either with a lawsuit, here, for example, the *Display* Technologies case on the '723 patent. That was a breach. Defense counsel -- and I respect that he admitted it. That was a breach. That takes this case out of all of the decades of

history that the defendants referred to in their briefing about the importance of a covenant not to sue.

And the same is true for the letter that Mr. Meyler sent in June of 2023. That was, yet again, another breach of the agreement and, therefore, the covenant not to sue. And you see the language that the Federal Circuit talks about here in *Gen-Probe*. When you have a material breach, all bets are off. You cannot breach that agreement and then in court rely on it to the detriment of the licensee. It's not a heads-they-wintails-we-lose situation. That's why this court absolutely has declaratory judgment jurisdiction.

the timeline, it's in the slides, and I will touch on it in a moment, but this was not a one-off instance where an errant letter went to the wrong party. Mr. Rothschild, his company, and his lawyers know what they were doing. They are very experienced in patent assertion. I believe defense counsel called Mr. Rothschild a prolific inventor. I have no opinion on that at the moment. He is certainly a prolific patent asserter, and they went after Valve again and again and again.

Valve had a reasonable apprehension of suit. You will see

When you look at the totality of the circumstances, this court has declaratory judgment jurisdiction to hear Valve's claims for both invalidity and unenforceability.

I will answer any questions you have, of course, Your Honor, but if I may add --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. MACHLEIDT: -- not once have the defendants responded to our arguments about *Gen-Probe* and the fact that even the Federal Circuit has focused on the relevance of a material breach. Perhaps defense counsel will say something in his rebuttal. You mentioned he gets the last word. If he does, whatever he says about *Gen-Probe* will be the first that Valve has heard of it. They simply cannot get around the fact that they have created the situation here and they have to contend with it.

THE COURT: All right. And I think that's what I'm coming back to, just sort of the fundamental nature of what it is that we're dealing with here. I mean, is there truly a reasonable apprehension, given that we have a broad, robust covenant not to sue? I mean, it simply took an e-mail, as it relates to the '723 litigation, to get the Rothschild defendants to back off.

So, I mean, is there a case or controversy around, you know, the validity of the patent or am I really looking at a lawsuit about a breach of a prior settlement agreement and perhaps enforcement of this Washington statute, the Patent Troll statute? I mean, is this something that should be in state court?

MR. MACHLEIDT: No. Your Honor.

And to your broad question, the answer is yes, Valve's causes of action fit under everything you just said. This is a declaratory judgment case. The facts justify that. It is also a

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case about breach. It is also a case about the Washington Troll Act.

And to sort of get to the first point you touched on, this, right here on the slide, is the Mr. Meyler letter from June of I believe the question you asked was, you know, is there an apprehension of suit, and you certainly touched on that when speaking with defendant counsel. The answer is yes. You see that in this letter. And mind you, this letter came after ample history between, on the one hand, Rothschild, his companies, and his lawyers, and, on the other hand, Valve. That was not the first correspondence. This comes after Valve had already reminded Mr. Meyler about that license agreement. You're right, it did eventually lead to the dismissal without prejudice of the Display Technologies case, but this comes not at the beginning of the parties' interactions, it comes at the end. And what you have -- it's a short letter, which is great for me because you can see it right here on the slide -- Mr. Meyler goes after Valve on behalf of Rothschild yet again. And this is a highly aggressive, assertive letter. Mr. Meyler references the fact that there are claim charts attached to this letter. He's certainly right. They're in the record at the docket sites. There were three claim charts for three patents. One of those three was the '221 patent. It is expressly licensed in the parties' license agreement. I believe when you look, it is Patent No. 12. You don't have to do any patent analysis. The

1 number is right there. Mr. Meyler attached a claim chart 2 accusing Valve of infringement of the '221 patent, and it refers 3 to Valve as the defendant. To avoid any doubt, Mr. Meyler says these charts "have been prepared in anticipation of litigation," 4 5 and the letter was sent on June 21st and wanted a response by 6 That's nine days. It's six business days. June 30th. 7 Mr. Meyler ends this letter by saying if we don't hear from you 8 within those nine days -- those six business days -- we're going

to assume that you'd "prefer to litigate."

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Again, going back to the totality of the circumstances that matters here, knowing that this letter, aggressive on its own, came after ample history between the parties, this gives rise to your main question, sort of the threshold question, this letter gives rise to that declaratory judgment jurisdiction.

And if I may, Your Honor, I have more of a timeline beforehand, but let me end with -- or let me talk about this timeline right here. Mr. Schenck reminded me of something that I -- let me talk about it once more, confirm it again. Defense counsel also said, in response to your question -- and I'm so glad you asked it -- if this case proceeds, the defendants will assert the '221 patent against Valve. And by the way, globally, the fact that, in theory, technically and legally, you know, that Valve would win a lawsuit because it has the defense of the agreement, that's not the question under the Declaratory Judgment Act and whether there's a reasonable apprehension of suit, right?

1 The answer is, there is. And when Valve was given that June 2 letter that said we're coming after you once more, early July, 3 Valve decided to stop being the punching bag, to stop being kind 4 of sort of on its back, on its heels, and it said, no, enough is 5 That letter was sort of the one assertion too many, and 6 that's why we're here. And you see it in the complaint. We have 7 alleged the whole history that leads us to that letter. But 8 that's why Valve said enough is enough and it brought this case. 9

THE COURT: On the issue of damages, that was an issue that was raised by counsel, arguing the absence of in this case. What would you say to that?

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MR. MACHLEIDT: I have two answers to that specific question. The first is, Valve paid real money to get what should have been peace between it and Rothschild. It did not get what it paid for, right? That is a measure of damages.

The other thing I'll say is any time you have lawyers involved, damages are at play. It takes time, effort, and money to ensure that whether you respond or not, or whatever course of conduct you go into, it costs you something to do that. So there certainly are damages.

Now, I will also add this: At the 12(b)(6) stage, the extent, the amount, the scope, that's not teed up here. What I will say is I think defense counsel, what they did brief is this notion that under the agreement, both -- I think he said waiver and then he also said that the agreement forecloses damages. I

won't put words in his mouth, but they briefed it, and he brought that back up.

You just asked me about damages. So let me make sure that I touch on this. This is Section 9.5 of the parties' license agreement. This is what the defendants rely on to say that even if everything we allege is sufficient to get past this stage, should we go forward, we're not entitled to damages under the contract. That's simply not true.

You see the highlighted sentence from Section 9.5 and then there's the red underline. This section talks about damages arising -- or a lack of damages arising out of the agreement and the licensed products. This is a term that appears quite commonly in license agreements of this nature, where the licensor, meaning Rothschild, doesn't want to get sued if one of Valve's customers, who is technically licensed under this agreement because the parties were supposed to have peace, that Rothschild doesn't want to get sued because that customer, who knows, trips and falls and one of Valve's products injures that person. That is what this section is dealing with.

We have underlined in red that last little bit, "and the Licensed Products," because it's important. In their briefing, they just use little ellipses and they pretend that Section 9.5 talks about no special punitive or exemplary damages relating to the agreement. That's not what this section talks about. It's exactly as I just mentioned.

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         Section 6.2 leaves no doubt. When there's breach, when we
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     have a fight like what we have here, both sides can go after
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     damages. So this absolutely is a case where damages exist and
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     are in play.
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              THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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              MR. MACHLEIDT: Your Honor, I'm going to look to my
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     colleagues, if I may have ten seconds? Because we kind of jumped
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     around, I want to make sure --
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              THE COURT: Sure.
              MR. MACHLEIDT: -- that defense counsel didn't raise
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     something that I have forgotten to.
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         There's more in the briefing. I'm happy to talk about all of
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     those other issues as well. I'm here to respond. I want to make
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     sure that I do that.
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              THE COURT: Yes. We have certainly read all the briefs.
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     looked very closely at the case law. So, yeah, take a moment to
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     confer with co-counsel. There's nothing wrong with a co-counsel
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     assist, but you have addressed the issues that are front and
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     center for the court.
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              MR. MACHLEIDT: And, actually, before I walk over there
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     and do that -- and thank you for that, Your Honor -- I recall
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     defense counsel pointed out he wasn't aware of a private right of
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     action case under the Troll Act. I understand why he said that.
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     There's certainly the Landmark case. He mentioned that
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Rothschild is not Landmark. And somewhere on one of my slides, I

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think there's something that relates exactly to that.

Sure, no two patent owners are exactly the same, but what you see here, and what we have mentioned in the complaint, is that Mr. Rothschild, through his companies -- himself, his companies, his lawyers -- he is a highly assertive person through his company's entity. Recently, just recently, I believe, Mr. Rothschild, through his various companies, surpassed the 1,200 mark in terms of number of lawsuits brought. Now, when I think about the Landmark case, I believe there's reference to about a thousand, maybe 1,800, demand letters being sent out by Landmark. Mr. Rothschild had cracked a thousand when it comes to actual lawsuits. I would like this case to proceed, and we will see if discovery proves how many demands. I assume it's a funnel, many more demands than lawsuit, but there are very close parallels between the parties in Landmark and Mr. Rothschild.

Also, yes, the *Landmark* case is a few steps ahead of us, but I know in California, for example, I believe Microsoft, in maybe the Northern District, did bring a private right of action case against a patent owner under the Washington Troll Act. A procedure there led to that claim sort of stopping early. But parties have certainly brought the type of case that we have here.

With that, Your Honor, may I confer real quick, make sure I'm not missing anything?

THE COURT: Of course.

MR. MACHLEIDT: Thank you.

Your Honor, briefly, my colleagues reminded me that waiver kind of at least was touched upon. I believe it's Section 11.5 of the agreement. It says that the parties, even if facts arise that, you know, in other circumstances, would potentially allow somebody to argue waiver, the contract says there is no waiver. That aside, waiver, especially when it comes to waiver by inaction, is a highly fact-specific analysis that, for that reason as well, certainly cannot be resolved at this stage.

Your Honor, with that, I'm always happy to answer your questions. If I have to, I'll ask your indulgence for a surrebuttal. But with that, I will give it back to defense counsel.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. MACHLEIDT: Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. MCPHAIL: Thank you, Your Honor. I will try to be brief.

One thing I think is rather interesting here is they make a great deal of Mr. Rothschild as a troll, but at no point have they ever bothered to file a complaint with the Washington Attorney General. It's an online form. I mean, it would have taken them no time at all, if they thought there was a legitimate beef here, if they thought there was a legitimate violation of the Act, to report it and let the Washington State Attorney General do the work for them, right? He's doing it against

Landmark. If Rothschild is so bad, then he would do it against Rothschild. Or perhaps maybe they did and the Attorney General decided there was nothing to do here, there was not a basis for acting, right? We don't know that right now. If this case goes on, discovery will tell.

They talk about a reasonable apprehension of suit. Your Honor has brought that up as well. There may be an apprehension, but it's not reasonable. And I think the '723 showed that. If there was an error made and the suit was filed, it only took a letter for that to go away immediately. No harm, no foul.

The Meyler letters. Two out of those three parties that he mentioned in that letter had legitimate claims and eventually brought suit against Valve on those claims. He made a clerical error on the '221 patent. Again, all it would have taken was a single letter to say, hey, not about QTI, not about the other one, but at least this patent we have a license to, so you need to drop it, and then it would have been two out of three they were arguing about. But, instead, we get this lawsuit.

Even if they're entitled, as I've said, to claim damages here under the contract, I don't think they have actually been damaged. I don't think they have actually been harmed. Lawyers' fees are not damages.

And, finally, being assertive in and of itself, as they've talked about Mr. Rothschild, doesn't make you a patent troll.

Landmark wrote a lot of letters. That's not a good thing.

Rothschild legitimately brought suits. That, under the Patent Troll Act, is supposed to factor into being a legitimate -- a good factor, right, that you are actually able to enforce your claims. The fact that he has filed so many suits should be a factor in his favor, not weighed against him.

Thank you.

THE COURT: I guess my final question to you is, you know -- I guess I will just state it plainly -- what's your best case on the declaratory judgment issue? There's plenty of case law about the operation of the covenant not to sue. I think that's clear. But the posture here is not like the cases that are cited in the brief, where there's litigation and then the parties come to an agreement that results in a covenant not to sue and the court finds that it's divested of its jurisdiction on the declaratory judgment action. We have got a situation here where there was a covenant not to sue and then there are these subsequent acts. I couldn't find a case.

MR. MCPHAIL: We will give them any covenant they want. And that act in and of itself, me standing here telling you that, is sufficient to divest this court of jurisdiction. I will give them any covenant they want not to sue. There is no reason for this case to go forward. We will put whatever language they want in writing and have it signed and notarized. But we are willing during this case to give them whatever covenant they want to take care of this. There was never, ever any intent to enforce the

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     '221 against them.
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              THE COURT: All right.
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              MR. MCPHAIL: Thank you.
              THE COURT: Thank you.
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              MR. MACHLEIDT: Your Honor, because we seem to be making
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     good time, may I surrebut? And I'm always happy to let Mr. --
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              THE COURT:
                          Briefly. Yeah, briefly.
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              MR. MACHLEIDT: So many of their arguments -- Dario
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     Machleidt on behalf of Valve.
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         So many of their arguments ignore the 12(b)(6) standard. I'm
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     going to begin with the last point first. Part of the reason
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     we're here is because Rothschild has repeatedly ignored an
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     existing covenant. We don't want another private promise from
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           That is why the DJ jurisdiction exists. It's easy for
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     them to break their promise. I imagine it's a lot harder for
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     them to violate a court order.
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         Issues that he raised about what we could have done with the
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     Attorney General, issues about this notion that if we had written
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     an e-mail, then they would have dismissed like they did last
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     time, it is utterly irrelevant to the 12(b)(6) stage. Those are
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     not facts. It's speculation. At best, it's argument that they
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     can save for a later day, after discovery, after we hear from
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     their people, who probably will say what they would have done had
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     things been different.
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         What we are doing here at the 12(b)(6) stage is looking at
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what actually happened and has Valve plausibly alleged enough to carry the day to get to the next stage, to get to discovery. The answer is yes. We don't have to show or prove or discuss what they would have done. We know what they did.

A question that keeps coming up kind of with my team is how many times is enough. Defense counsel says we will give them anything and had they just written another letter or an e-mail, this would have been over. This was the third time. It's a slippery slope to talk about what could have happened if people had done things differently. Because if we go down that road, I'm going to say, well, very likely, Mr. Rothschild and Mr. Meyler, they're going to come back against Valve a fourth, a fifth, a sixth. We don't have to do that. The facts that we have alleged that you see in the complaint get us more than we need to pass the 12(b)(6) stage.

I'm going to try to end with this, Your Honor. There was argument about how the fact that Rothschild has filed many lawsuits somehow counts in his favor and relates to the good faith factors. They can argue what they want come summary judgment or trial, but my response to that is it's not true.

You see in the complaint the standard operating procedure by Mr. Rothschild is to sue and bail when pressed. The vast majority, and I believe all of them, they don't make it to the merits, they don't make it down the road, because when the defendants stand up and fight and defend themselves, Rothschild

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     and his companies run away. We had that in Texas, again,
 2
     relating to this same issue.
 3
         Defense counsel is right, two of those other patents in
 4
     Rothschild's entities, referred to in Mr. Meyler's letter, they
 5
     did ultimately sue Valve. They sued valve in East Texas within,
 6
     I think, about two months of Valve filing this lawsuit. We view
 7
     them as complete retaliatory actions. Just recently -- and by
 8
     the way, both parties referenced those cases, which is why I'm
 9
     talking about them now. Just recently, all of those actions in
10
     Texas were dismissed. The magistrate judge agreed with Valve
11
     that those cases should never have been filed in East Texas, and
12
     Valve is currently seeking sanctions for those very lawsuits. We
13
     don't need to go into good faith, they can argue that down the
14
     road, but that is not evidence of good faith.
15
         Any questions, Your Honor?
16
              THE COURT:
                          No.
                               That's it.
17
              MR. MACHLEIDT: Thank you for giving me, giving us,
     giving Valve, the opportunity to present our case.
18
19
              THE COURT: Very good.
20
         All right. I'm a firm believer in the moving party getting
21
     the last word. So if there's anything that you would like to
22
     respond to there that was said, something either outside of your
23
     reply or your rebuttal, but if you would like to address any of
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Thank you, Your Honor, but I think I have

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25

it.

MR. MCPHAIL:

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1
     said enough. Thank you very much.
 2
              THE COURT: Very good.
 3
         Well, thank you all for coming and arguing. I have been
 4
     sitting with the briefs. We have got a draft order that we need
 5
     to complete, so I suspect that we will get an order out fairly
 6
     soon.
 7
         I'm looking at the issue here, the threshold issue about the
 8
     court's jurisdiction, of course, and, you know, I'm not finding
 9
     any cases with this exact posture. So perhaps this is a one of
     one, maybe this is that unique case. But you all will have our
10
11
     answer very soon.
12
         Is there anything else that you would like to address while
13
     we're all convened?
14
                              No, Your Honor.
              MR. MACHLEIDT:
15
              MR. MCPHAIL: Not from defendants, Your Honor.
16
     you.
17
              THE COURT: All right. Thank you, all. Take care.
     Have a good weekend.
18
              MR. MACHLEIDT:
19
                              Thank you, Your Honor.
20
                                (Adjourned.)
21
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September 20, 2024 - 25

1	CERTIFICATE
2	
3	I, Nickoline M. Drury, RMR, CRR, Court Reporter for the
4	United States District Court in the Western District of
5	Washington at Seattle, do certify that the foregoing is a correct
6	transcript, to the best of my ability, from the record of
7	proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
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9	
10	/s/ Nickoline Drury
11	Nickoline Drury
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